• Samuel Ng

Will the Yuan dethrone the Dollar? Not so fast

Recent crises such as fears surrounding inflation, recession, and war, have led nations, institutions and individuals alike to seek out “safe havens” to shore up their wealth. For the past century, this safe haven has been the US dollar given its position as the world’s reserve currency of choice. China has been striving towards offering the Renminbi as the go-to alternative to the greenback in a multipolar world. Whether it succeeds is another question.

China, an economic giant, is soon to become the world’s largest economy. Despite its status, China’s currency, the Renminbi, is not currently the primary reserve currency nor the second. This is something Beijing sees as a possible limitation to its economic potential and, perhaps more importantly, its influence.

The People’s Republic has been building the infrastructure, architecture and relationships for the Renminbi to act as a new anchor currency to the US dollar (Crawford, 2022). Beijing has promoted its use in the Asia-Pacific, regional blocs and Belt and Road Initiative countries, and especially among those who frown upon US dollar dominance (Lockett, 2019; Sputnik News Agency, 2022; OECD, 2018).

Presently, the Chinese Yuan is the third most common reserve currency behind the greenback and the Euro. With China’s economic size, the greatest tool Beijing has to push the Renminbi as an alternative is through trade (Hancock, 2022). Every time trade is conducted, parties need to choose either to settle in the importer’s currency, the exporter’s currency, or a third currency (i.e. US dollar).

China, by far the biggest manufacturer of goods globally, sells its goods all over the world (World Bank, 2021). It is extremely likely that someone would find at least one product made in China in their close proximity. In manufacturing these goods, China imports a titanic volume of raw materials, fuels, machinery and parts (Gao, Qiu & Woo, 2021). With this, all trade provides Beijing with an opportunity to request for payments to be denominated in Renminbi.

In an unexpected turn, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has given China the optimal climate to highlight the drawbacks of the US dollar and the viability of its own Yuan. Western sanctions against Russia, including freezing her foreign currency reserves, have shown to other nations that their own foreign currency reserves are not untouchable (DiCamillo, 2022). These sanctions have shaken the faith in the greenback, demonstrating that Washington can arbitrarily and unilaterally, based on its own policy considerations, choose to cut off reserves of a foreign nation (Bretell, 2022).

Whilst US partners are unlikely to be sanctioned, non-US allies may be more inclined to hedge their risks and diversify, seeking out currencies that may not be so easily severed by the West. China’s Renminbi consequently presents itself as a strong alternative. Since the invasion, Beijing has also indicated its willingness to continue to do business and trade with countries shunned by the West (Chimits & Hmaidi, 2022).

In this light, China has adopted Churchill's pragmatic saying, “never let a good crisis go to waste”. Beijing has recognised the importance of the BRICS gathering, particularly since the Ukraine War and Russia’s exclusion from the Western-dominated system. Trade between BRICS members has increased 38 percent since the start of 2022 (Rosen, 2022). With the meeting of the bloc in July 2022, China has used this opportune climate to push for the group to adopt the Renminbi as the de facto currency of choice for trade (Turner, 2022).

But while China has sought to increase the Yuan’s attractiveness among these regional collections and her economic partners, the currency still only holds a minute share in global transactions. Compared with the US dollar’s high of 42 percent (Goldberg, Lerman & Reichgott, 2022), the Renminbi accounts for just over two percent of global currency reserves (Glover, 2022).

As part of its flagship Belt and Road Initiative, China has issued loans and lines of credit to participating countries, providing an opportunity to increase the Yuan’s prevalence and internationalisation (Liang, 2020). Having denominated in Renminbi, China is effectively forcing these nations to maintain large reserves of its currency to ensure repayment, or the country faces the risk of defaulting. Yet, these measures only extend to closely aligned economies such as Cambodia and various African nations (Xinhua News Agency, 2013; Dahir, 2018).

While China has actively negotiated currency swap deals (Zhang, Zhang & Woo, 2022), established their version of SWIFT (the ‘Cross-Border Interbank Payment System’) (Eichengreen, 2022), and introduced a digital Renminbi (Deutsche Bank, 2021), its campaign to present the Yuan as a “sanction-proof” alternative to the greenback is plagued with inherent and deep-rooted issues.

China has a reputation for enacting excessive punitive economic actions on its trade partners, including Australia, Lithuania, and Taiwan (Walker, 2020; Andrijauskas, 2022; Tan, 2022). As a case in point, the United States sanctioned Russia for prosecuting an aggressive war against a fellow sovereign nation, while Beijing unofficially sanctioned Australia for calling for an investigation into the origins of COVID-19 (Walsh, 2021).

Holding reserve currency is comparable to holding shares. The holder would want the issuing country to be run effectively, run sustainability and stably, and would want the government to avoid tensions and controversy. China’s actions do not necessarily emanate stability, or any of the listed.

The Communist Party’s incessant need to control every aspect of China’s society and economy has inadvertently dampened its own currency ambitions. For instance, Chinese citizens are prohibited from taking up to US$50,000 out of the country annually (Lee, 2021). This law lays bare two phenomena: one, Beijing believes there is a need to effectively imprison the wealth of its citizens onshore, and two, it is so uncertain about the value and volatility of the Renminbi that the law itself is denominated in US dollars.

When compared to the US dollar, the Chinese Yuan faces even greater hurdles. The preeminent position of the greenback as the world’s reserve currency of choice is attributable to several factors (Bartholomeusz, 2022); the liquidity in US financial markets, the strength of regulations in those markets, the transparency of the American judicial system, and the independence of its central bank (Best, 2022; International Monetary Fund, 2005; Federal Reserve Bank, 2019).

In contrast, China’s financial markets are not fully developed and are subject to capital controls (Prasad, 2016). The Renminbi is also tightly regulated, not freely floating, and far from being primarily driven by market forces (China Power - CSIS, 2016). China’s judicial system is also notoriously clouded and untrusted, and its central bank, the People’s Bank of China, is under direct supervision from Zhongnanhai (Zhu, 2021; CNBC, 2019; Wildau & Mitchell, 2021).

Despite the speculation and commentary, the Yuan, in the short-term, does not look likely to be a viable alternative to the dollar. Although Renminbi may be preferred among small regional blocs, China’s close economic partners and countries traditionally at odds with the West, it will struggle to penetrate and find favour in other nations.

All in all, China’s international ambitions for its currency are simply held back by its domestic and foreign policies, inherent characteristics, and the persistent strength of the dollar.



Andrijauskas, K. (2022, May 12). An Analysis of China’s Economic Coercion Against Lithuania . (Council on Foreign Relations) Retrieved August 2022, from Council on Foreign Relations:

Bartholomeusz, S. (2022, June 30). China’s long march towards world currency domination . (Sydney Morning Herald) Retrieved August 2022, from Sydney Morning Herald:

Best, R. (2022, September 02). How the U.S. Dollar Became the World's Reserve Currency . (Investopedia) Retrieved September 2022, from Investopedia:

Bretell, K. (2022, March 29). Analysis: As sanctions 'weaponize' U.S. dollar, some Treasury buyers could fall back . (Reuters) Retrieved August 2022, from Reuters:

Chimits, F., & Hmaidi, A. (2022, August 30). China Moves to Fill The Void Left By Russia Sanctions – On Its Own Terms . (The Diplomat) Retrieved August 2022, from The Diplomat:

China Power - CSIS. (2016, February 11). Is the Renminbi Undervalued or Overvalued? . (CSIS - Center for Strategic & International Studies) Retrieved August 2022, from CSIS - Center for Strategic & International Studies:

CNBC. (2019, August 28). How the PBOC controls the Yuan amid a trade war. (CNBC) Retrieved August 2022, from CNBC:

Crawford, K. (2022, August 19). China plans to have its currency rival the dollar. A new study assesses its prospects. . Retrieved August 2022, from Standford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR):

Dahir, A. L. (2018, May 29). There is growing momentum to adopt China’s yuan as a reserve currency in Africa . (Quartz) Retrieved August 2022, from Quartz:

Deutsche Bank. (2021, July 14). Digital yuan: what is it and how does it work? . (Deutsche Bank) Retrieved August 2022, from Deutsche Bank:

DiCamillo, N. (2022, March 01). The G-7 has frozen all of Russia’s reserve assets in their countries . (Quartz) Retrieved August 2022, from Quartz:

Eichengreen, B. (2022). Sanctions, SWIFT, and China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payments System . CSIS - Center for Strategic & Security Studies, CSIS Briefs. Washington D.C., United States of America: CSIS - Center for Strategic & Security Studies. Retrieved from

Federal Reserve Bank. (2019, December 31). Why is it important to separate Federal Reserve monetary policy decisions from political influence? . (Federal Reserve Bank) Retrieved August 2022, from Federal Reserve Bank:

Gao, L., Qiu, S., & Woo, R. (2021, June 07). China's imports grow at fastest pace in decade as materials prices surge . (Reuters) Retrieved August 2022, from Reuters:

Glover, G. (2022, July 02). China is doubling down on its bid to challenge the dollar's global dominance. Analysts lay out why it's unlikely to succeed. . (Business Insider) Retrieved August 2022, from Business Insider:

Goldberg, L. S., Lerman, R., & Reichgott, D. (2022, July 05). The U.S. Dollar’s Global Roles: Revisiting Where Things Stand . (Liberty Street Economics - Federal Reserve Bank of New York) Retrieved August 2022, from Liberty Street Economics - Federal Reserve Bank of New York:

Hancock, T. (2022, July 25). China’s Trade Dominance Is Boosting Renminbi’s Reserve Status . (Bloomberg) Retrieved August 2022, from Bloomberg:

International Monetary Fund. (2005). Chapter 9: Assessing the Legal Infrastructure for Financial Systems. In I. M. Fund, Financial Sector Assessment: A Handbook (pp. 223-239). Washington D.C., United States of America: International Monetary Fund.

Lee, B. (2021, July 30). China’s capital controls: here to stay? . (Central Banking) Retrieved August 2022, from Central Banking:

Liang, Y. (2020, February 20). RMB Internationalization and Financing Belt-Road Initiative: An MMT Perspective . The Chinese Economy, 53(4), 317-328.

Lockett, H. (2019, August 09). China’s new renminbi level set to pressure Asia currencies . Retrieved August 2022, from Financial Times:

OECD. (2018). China's Belt and Road Initiative in the Global Trade, Investment and Finance Landscape . OECD, OECD Business and Finance Outlook. Paris, France: OECD.

Prasad, E. (2016, April 27). China’s economy and financial markets: Reforms and risks . (Brookings Institute) Retrieved August 2022, from Brookings Institute:

Rosen, P. (2022, June 23). Vladimir Putin says Russia's trade with China, India, Brazil, and South Africa has jumped 38% amid sanctions and war in Ukraine . (Business Insider) Retrieved August 2022, from Business Insider:

Sputnik News Agency. (2022, July 13). BRICS Could Create Its Own Reserve Currency, Russia's Medvedev Says . Retrieved August 2022, from Global Times:

Tan, S.-L. (2022, August 10). Beijing’s new trade restrictions on Taiwan after Pelosi’s visit are a drop in the ocean . (CNBC) Retrieved August 2022, from CNBC:

Turner, C. (2022, June 22). BRICS: The new name in reserve currencies . (ING) Retrieved August 2022, from ING:

Walker, T. (2020, December 08). Timeline of a broken relationship: how China and Australia went from chilly to barely speaking . (The Conversation) Retrieved August 2022, from The Conversation:

Walsh, M. (2021, January 03). Australia called for a COVID-19 probe. China responded with a trade war . (Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC)) Retrieved August 2022, from Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC):

Wildau, G., & Mitchell, T. (2021). China asserts Communist party control over PBoC . (Financial Times) Retrieved August 2022, from Financial Times:

World Bank. (2021). China . (World Bank) Retrieved August 2022, from World Bank:

Xinhua News Agency. (2013, November 24). China provides 33 mln USD in free-interest loan to Cambodia for development projects . (Global Times) Retrieved August 2022, from Global Times:

Zhang, E., Zhang, A., & Woo, R. (2022, July 04). China central bank upgrades currency swap with HKMA, expands size . (Reuters) Retrieved August 2022, from Reuters:

Zhu, M. (2021, April 03). Jury still out on China’s legal reform and judicial independence . (South China Morning Post) Retrieved August 2022, from South China Morning Post:

This article represent the views of contributors to STEAR's online digital publication, and not those of STEAR, which takes no institutional positions.

81 views0 comments