India–Japan Relations: A Blueprint for the ‘Asian Century’

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Introduction 

The global centre of gravity is shifting towards Asia, paving the way for the Asian Century. In that context, India and Japan are standing at the junction where they can script the way forward for the global order. This article examines the evolution and strategic depth of the India–Japan partnership and argues for a stronger India-Japan relationship needed to make this an Asian Century.

The 21st century has been hailed as the “Asian Century,” a time frame when the demographic, economic, and political rise of Asia reshapes the global order (Asian Development Bank, 2011). 

Amidst this transition, the India–Japan partnership emerges not as a peripheral alliance, but as a central and transformative force. Rooted in civilisation dialogue and matured through shared democratic values, the bilateral relationship has evolved into a strategic axis that complements the larger Indo-Pacific vision. 

It is this maturation, driven by the converging imperatives of economic growth, maritime security, technological collaboration, and geopolitical alignment, that positions India–Japan relations as a model for cooperative power in a multipolar world. To achieve this goal, however, several challenges must be addressed. These include enhancing technology and R&D, fostering innovation, improving ease of business, reducing bureaucratic red tape, promoting cultural exchange and trust, encouraging gender participation, and overcoming orthodoxies.

Strategic Convergence in a Shifting Geopolitical Landscape 

India and Japan, both long-standing democracies and advocates of a free and open Indo-Pacific, have found increased alignment amidst the fluidity of great power politics. The Indo-Pacific has become the epicentre of strategic contestation, especially vis-à-vis the assertiveness of China and the recalibrations of the United States. In such a landscape, India and Japan share concerns over sea lane security, overdependence on Chinese manufacturing, and the erosion of rules-based order. 

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), with Australia and the US, represents a key platform where Indo-Japanese strategic interests converge. However, unlike military alliances, the Quad is deliberately non-aligned, a format that suits India’s traditional strategic autonomy and Japan’s pacifist constitution. This pragmatic, purpose-driven alignment represents a new model of cooperation that doesn’t mirror NATO but is nevertheless committed to a stable balance of power in Asia. 

Moreover, both countries have taken cautious but concerted steps to enhance defence ties. The Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), joint military exercises like “Dharma Guardian,” and enhanced defence technology cooperation reflect a growing comfort in each other’s strategic calculus (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2020)

Countries around the Indo-Pacific region rely heavily on the SLOC (Sea Lanes of Communication) of the SCS (South China Sea), the Bay of Bengal, and the IOR (Indian Ocean Region). Japan's crude oil predominantly comes from the Middle East. As of 2023, approximately 95.1% of its oil passes through the Indian Pacific region (Reuters, 2024). Japan’s energy security heavily relies on the security of these sea lanes in the region. India is a key actor with the ability to provide stability in this region, which is essential for Japan's energy needs due to its close vicinity.

Economic Diplomacy

Official Development Assistance (ODA) was the first form of Japan's economic involvement with India; however, it has since developed into a relationship based on innovation, infrastructure, and economic resilience. This change is best illustrated by the Delhi–Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC), Mumbai–Ahmedabad High-Speed Rail (Bullet Train) Projects, and investments in India's Smart Cities Mission (Japan Bank for International Cooperation, n.d.; Ministry of External Affairs, 2017; The Economic Times, 2023).

Significantly, both countries are also recalibrating their economic strategies to reduce dependence on China. Through initiatives like the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI), India and Japan, along with Australia, aim to rewire trade flows, secure critical minerals, and diversify manufacturing networks (Press Information Bureau, 2021; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, n.d.) This deepening economic synergy reflects more than just transactional pragmatism; it represents a vision for an Indo-Pacific economy that is decentralised, transparent, and equitable. 

Having said that, this economic alliance, though broad in ambition, continues to suffer from structural and functional weaknesses. Execution of mega-infrastructure projects such as the DMIC and the Ahmedabad–Mumbai bullet train has been significantly lagging behind schedule because of red tape and bureaucratic delays, problems related to land acquisition, and unbalanced coordination between the Indian central government and state administrations (Dholera Smart City Info, n.d.). Besides, Japan's conservative business culture and India's byzantine regulatory environment more often than not result in underspent committed money and delayed implementation of projects. 

These obstacles, unless resolved, can dilute the catalysing impact of two-way investment. For the partnership to also be economically resilient, both countries need to institutionalise quicker project facilitation arrangements, accelerate public-private interface, and apply a faster, more trust-driven approach to economic diplomacy.

Technological and Digital Collaborations

India and Japan have started investigating opportunities in crucial and cutting-edge technologies like semiconductors, artificial intelligence, 5G, and space in a time when technology dictates strategic advantage. To secure chip supply and jointly expand fabrication capabilities, the two countries inked the "India–Japan Semiconductor Supply Chain Partnership" in 2023 (Press Information Bureau, 2023) This collaboration is strategic and timely given the vulnerabilities revealed by the global chip scarcity and tensions in Taiwan.

Furthermore, a new channel for bilateral cooperation is provided by digital public infrastructure, an area in which India is a leader thanks to its Aadhaar and UPI systems (Biometric Update, 2023; Finextra, 2024).

Cultural and Civilizational Ties

India and Japan have a civilisational affinity marked by centuries of cultural exchange. Buddhism is one such link. It originated in India and found expression in Japan, shaping its art, culture, architecture, philosophy, and spirituality. Shared religious heritage significantly inspires cultural diplomacy between the two nations. A fine example of this is Japan’s contributions to the restoration of Nalanda University and the Buddhist circuits in India (Narsimhan, 2019).

The Japan–India Student Conference, the annual Festival of India in Japan, and the Japan Foundation's funding of Japanese language courses in Indian universities are other examples of cultural diplomacy. 

Collaboration in anime, cinema (e.g., the Animated Ramayan), and literary exchanges is expanding. However, this domain remains underleveraged. With India’s rich tradition in storytelling, design, and music, and Japan’s global cultural influence in animation, literature, and technology, structured initiatives could deepen people-to-people ties.

Strategic Autonomy and Normative Alignment

India’s foreign policy rests on the bedrock of strategic autonomy — a principle it has not compromised even as it aligns with partners like Japan. Simultaneously, Japan, under its new National Security Strategy, given by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, reasserts itself as a “normal nation” willing to play a more active strategic role. This convergence without subordination represents a new kind of bilateralism (Nobukatsu, 2022.)

Along with building a stable, open, and multipolar Asia, the India–Japan relationship is also crucial for both nations as they aim to counter China, which poses a mutual threat to both. For India and Japan, concerns regarding China centre around the same key issues: anxiety over territorial sovereignty, fears for the future of free and open navigation on the high seas (Pant, H. V. & Mattoo, S. 2024).

This balance of interests and ideals offers a replicable framework for other middle powers caught in the crosswinds of great power rivalry. 

Challenges in this Bilateral Relation 

Despite the shared values, common threats, growing collaborations, and participation in multilateral groups, the India-Japan bilateral relationship has not seen its full potential. Multiple underlying challenges are yet to be addressed, and inhibiting factors need to be overcome.

1. Regional Priorities and Geostrategic Engagements 

The primary reason India-Japan ties have not blossomed to the full extent yet is that both nations are largely occupied with their respective regional concerns. India’s strategic focus is largely toward managing South Asia dynamics, relationships with Pakistan and China, and its strength in the Indian Ocean Region. Whereas Japan is preoccupied with the security architecture in East Asia, persistent tensions with China, North Korea's missile program, and its alliance obligations with the United States.

2. Pacifism vs Assertion

Japan’s pacifist constitution stops it from acting assertively in international defence partnerships. The Abe era has produced a significant increase in Japan’s geopolitical assertiveness, which is likely to endure, but Japan still exercises caution in engaging in hard military alliances, especially with countries like India, which pursue a policy of strategic autonomy (Hughes, C. W., Patalano, A., & Ward, R., 2021).

3. Trade Difference

The trade ties India and Japan are underdeveloped so much so that India has more trade happening with China then Japan. Regarding economic matters such as regulations governing e-commerce and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, India and Japan have different objectives. Due to high quality and service requirements, as well as linguistic difficulties, India is having difficulty breaking into the Japanese market.

4.  Lack of People to people connection 

There exist a clear lack of public excitement or cultural exchange between Indian and Japanese citizens, in contrast to India's ties with the US or Russia, or Japan's ties with South Korea or China. Language hurdles, limited in-person interactions, and small academic partnerships all continue to limit the bilateral relationship's soft power element.

Conclusion: Towards a Multipolar and Cooperative Asian Order 

The relationship between Japan and India is a prime example of what an Asian Century based on collaboration rather than dominance could entail. It resists the dichotomies of East vs West, alliance versus non-alignment, or security versus growth. Rather, it symbolises a partnership based on mutual respect, common goals, and normative alignment that is both practical and moral. 

The quality of leadership in Asia will define the century as global geopolitics changes, not just the continent's ascent. With their strategic maturity, democratic ideals, and cooperative culture, India and Japan provide a model for an inclusive, robust, and balanced Asian Century. However, the dream is a distant one. Both nations need to walk their share of the distance to reach a point where this can be achieved.

This article represents the views of external contributors to STEAR's online digital publication, and not those of STEAR, which takes no institutional positions.

Shivam Billore is a writer, researcher, and solo traveler with over six years of experience in content development across domains such as geopolitics, sustainability, technology, and culture. He holds a Master’s degree in Conflict Management and Development, and his academic interests include peace studies, international relations, and traditional knowledge systems.

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