Europe’s Strategic Awakening? Netherlands’ Intervention in Nexperia and the Future of EU Chip Autonomy

Semiconductors have become the invisible infrastructure of contemporary life, enabling everything from artificial intelligence and electric vehicles to advanced defence systems and industrial automation. As these chips underpin both technological innovation and economic resilience, control over their production has become a defining issue in global politics. Governments are no longer treating semiconductors merely as commercial goods but as strategic assets, driving a worldwide push to reduce dependencies, secure supply chains, and assert national and regional autonomy.

Chip production is highly concentrated and deeply exposed to geopolitical tensions. Today, the global semiconductor supply chain depends on a handful of actors; the United States dominates chip design and advanced equipment, while Taiwan commands an unparalleled position in cutting-edge manufacturing. This concentration has turned technological interdependence into a vulnerability. Any disruption, whether triggered by export controls, sanctions, or a crisis in the Taiwan Strait, could ripple across European Industries, from automotive and energy to telecommunications and defence (Gorana Grgić, 2025)

Illustration of a semiconductor chip featuring the Dutch flag. Source: Dutch government puts Nexperia on a short leash over chip security fears

Europe’s position within this ecosystem is paradoxical. Despite being an economic powerhouse, the EU controls only a modest share of this semiconductor value chain and remains reliant on external suppliers for critical components and advanced nodes. The pandemic-era chip shortages exposed these dependencies, prompting European policymakers to recognise that access to semiconductors is not merely an economic concern but a matter of sovereignty and security (EESC, 2025). As the United States and China build increasingly uncompetitive technological spheres, Europe risks being caught in the middle unless it develops its own autonomous capacity.

To understand how these structural pressures manifest in practice, it is crucial to examine instances in which Europe’s vulnerabilities become apparent through specific policy actions. This article contends that the Dutch intervention in Nexperia represents a pivotal moment in Europe’s semiconductor strategy, primarily because it highlights the dual nature of Europe’s vulnerability. The Nexperia case demonstrates that the EU’s technological foundations are jeopardised not only by external geopolitical dependencies (e.g., the Taiwan Strait) but also by internal structural weaknesses and foreign corporate governance practices. This action signifies a shift in the EU’s approach, moving from open markets to an emphasis on security and resilience, with the protection of existing capacities becoming a primary goal of European autonomy.

The Nexperia Case

Within this context, the Netherlands’ intervention in Nexperia is more than a national policy decision. It is a litmus test for Europe’s strategic awakening, raising the fundamental question: can the EU transform its semiconductor vulnerability into genuine technological might?

The Nexperia intervention is a pivotal moment in Europe's technological independence. Nexperia is a major European semiconductor manufacturer specialising in discrete and power devices, with production sites in the Netherlands, Germany, and the UK. (Nexperia, 2025) Yet, while it operates within Europe, the Chinese group Wingtech has owned the company in its entirety since 2019, making it one of the most sensitive foreign-controlled chip firms in the EU. Its components are essential for Europe’s automotive, industrial, and consumer electronics supply chains, positioning the company at the intersection of technological capacity and geopolitical exposure.

On September 30, 2025, the Dutch government invoked the Goods Availability Act, an emergency measure last applied in 1952, after serious concerns arose about actions attributed to Nexperia’s CEO. These actions allegedly involved the unlawful transfer of assets, funds, and sensitive technological knowledge to a foreign entity, raising apprehension about the potential loss of critical semiconductor production capacity from European soil. Given Nexperia’s crucial role in Europe’s automotive industry and consumer electronics supply chain, Dutch authorities saw a threat in the potential unexpected inaccessibility of essential technologies during a crisis, which would undermine both national security and broader EU strategic autonomy. (Government.nl, 2025)

The Dutch government has now adopted a more cautious stance. In a recent statement, Minister Vincent Karremans welcomed China’s decision to lessen its licensing restrictions on Nexperia’s legacy chips. The Hague, in turn, interpreted it as a constructive gesture towards establishing global supply chains. While the Dutch authorities have temporarily suspended their emergency order, they continue to closely monitor the actual resumption of the promised chip shipments from Nexperia’s Chinese facilities. (Government.nl, 2025)

Europe’s Strategic Shift: From Dependence to Autonomy

The Dutch action in the Nexperia case was not just political; it also served to protect Europe’s last stronghold in older chip production. According to official state documents, actions by the company’s CEO aimed at transferring production assets and intellectual property abroad posed an immediate threat to Europe’s technological base and to the security of chip supply for key industries. Had the Dutch authorities not acted, Europe’s remaining front-end manufacturing capacity in this segment would have disappeared, leaving the continent even more dependent on external suppliers at a moment of rising geopolitical competition. (Karremans, 2025)

In this context, invoking the Goods Availability Acts marks the practical application of the philosophy behind the EU Chips Act. The Act, devised to increase the EU’s share of global chip production to 20% by 2030, is not just an investment plan but a fundamentally security doctrine. It seeks to shield Europe from systemic technological dependence and to preserve the operational continuity of its industries amid potential geopolitical disruption. The Nexperia case underscores that Europe’s semiconductor vulnerabilities lie not only in future technologies but also in the legacy nodes essential to its industrial and strategic sectors. Should these capacities erode, it will generate immediate strategic exposure, not just hypothetical future risk. (European Commission, 2025)

The EU Chips Act and increasingly assertive Foreign Direct Investment screening mechanisms, which review foreign investments, mark a decisive policy shift: national security and resilience now outweigh market liberalism as the primary organising principle of European semiconductor governance. It is this recalibration, from a logic of efficiency to a logic of sovereignty, that elevates the Nexperia intervention to a pivotal position in Europe’s geoeconomic awakening.

The EU’s Middle Path: Resilience over Self-Sufficiency

Europe’s semiconductor strategy is often framed as an effort to mirror Asian manufacturing ecosystems or to achieve complete technological autonomy. However, this view is flawed: not only would such an endeavour be economically impractical, but it would also be strategically unnecessary, given the intricate interconnections of global semiconductor production. Instead, the EU is aiming for a more sensible target: enhancing resilience. (European Commission, 2025) This strategy is grounded in the current political emphasis on ‘de-risking’ rather than full ‘decoupling’, recognising that the aim is not to dismantle global supply chains but to mitigate critical vulnerabilities within them. Resilience means managing interdependencies in European terms rather than cutting them off. Within this framework, the Dutch intervention at Nexperia stands as a pivotal example. By safeguarding legacy chip production, which is crucial to Europe's automotive, transportation, industrial machinery, and medical device sectors, the EU ensures continuity in areas where it already has industrial significance. While protecting these capacities does not render Europe independent, it prevents it from becoming structurally defenceless.

Europe’s Critical Vulnerability: The Taiwan Strait Connection

Yet, even with the Nexperia precedent, Europe’s semiconductor posture remains profoundly asymmetric. While the United States excels in chip design and export-control frameworks, and China heavily invests in expanding domestic production, Europe faces a significant vulnerability centred on a single point of failure: Taiwan. The island’s semiconductor powerhouse, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, produces the world’s most advanced chips, thereby playing a crucial role in global technological competition. Any military conflict or blockade in the Taiwan Strait would immediately disrupt the supply of these cutting-edge processors, a scenario that European industries are currently ill-prepared to handle. Europe lacks the technological capacity to swiftly replace these inputs, meaning such a crisis could simultaneously cripple its digital, automotive, and defence infrastructures. (Lu, 2022)

In conclusion, the Nexperia intervention marks a turning point in Europe’s quest for technological sovereignty. It illustrates that the EU is no longer inclined to regard semiconductors merely as economic commodities but as strategic assets integral to its security framework. By taking decisive action to protect legacy chip production, the Netherlands has highlighted a broader European vulnerability. The continent’s technological foundations are susceptible not only to geopolitical instability in Asia but also to internal structural weaknesses and foreign corporate governance practices.

At the same time, the case illustrates the limits of Europe’s current position. While the EU can protect its existing industrial base and strengthen resilience, it remains deeply constrained by its dependencies on Taiwan for advanced semiconductor nodes. This asymmetry underscores a central truth: Europe’s future power will depend on its ability to balance interdependence with strategic autonomy by investing in its own capabilities while maintaining open yet secure supply chains. Ultimately, the episode is more than an isolated national action: it’s a microcosm of Europe’s broader strategic awakening, one that will shape the continent’s position in the global semiconductor order for years to come.

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References

European Economic and Social Committee (EESC). (2025). Addressing structural shortages and strengthening strategic autonomy in the semiconductor ecosystem. https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/our-work/opinions-information-reports/opinions/addressing-structural-shortages-and-strengthening-strategic-autonomy-semiconductor-ecosystem

European Commission. (2025). European Chips Act. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/european-chips-act

Government of the Netherlands (2025). Update on invoking Goods Availability Act. Update on invoking Goods Availability Act (Wbg), 6th of November 2025 | Diplomatic statement | Government.nl

Grgić, G., & Fakin, M. (2025, May). Europe’s Semiconductor Strengths and Strains. CSS Analysis in Security Policy. No. 360. Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich. https://css.ethz.ch/en/center/CSS-news/2025/05/europes-semiconductor-strengths-and-strains.html

Karremans, V. Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy (Netherlands) (2025, November 19). Letter to the Parliament on the latest developments concerning Nexperia. Government of the Netherlands. Letter to the Parliament on the latest developments concerning Nexperia | Parliamentary document | Government.nl

Lu, G. A. (2022). Taiwan’s Semiconductor Dominance: Implications for cross-strait relations and the prospect of forceful unification. Center for Strategic and International Studies.  https://www.csis.org/blogs/perspectives-innovation/taiwans-semiconductor-dominance-implications-cross-strait-relations

Nexperia. (2025). Global semiconductor company. https://www.nexperia.com/