The Australia-Indonesia Common Security Treaty: Hedging in the Indo-Pacific
- Eugenia A. Meganingtyas
- 6 hours ago
- 8 min read
Introduction
On November 12, 2025, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and President Prabowo Subianto announced the substantive conclusion of a new security treaty between Australia and Indonesia. This long-standing relationship was briefly strained in April, when the defense and security publication, Janes, reported that Russia was seeking access to the Papua airbase, just 1,400 km from Darwin, Australia (Rahmat, 2025). The Indonesian Defense Minister later rejected this claim (South China Morning Post, 2025).
The two countries have now reaffirmed their ties, committing to regular consultations under the Australia-Indonesia Common Security Treaty. Yet, a closer reading of the joint statement reveals slightly differing narratives. While Albanese underlined the importance of “acting together,” Subianto reiterated the usual “good neighbors ” rhetoric.
Extending the discussion beyond the bilateral context, this article showcases how the treaty fits into Indonesia’s hedging strategy in the Indo-Pacific, drawing on Cheng-Chwee Kuik’s (2021) conceptualization of the term as an insurance-seeking behavior common among smaller states in the region. Additionally, the treaty’s expected impact on the regional order will be assessed based solely on the available official statement, as the signed treaty will be available in January 2026.
The Need to Not Choose Sides
Kuik (2016; 2021) posits three elements of hedging: not choosing sides, simultaneous resistance and cooperation, and diversification of partnerships. Starting with the first, the treaty’s current language and framework do not lock Indonesia into a rigid alignment with Australia. Foreign Minister Penny Wong’s official statement reads that the two countries will “consult each other in the case of adverse challenges to either party or to their common security interests and, if appropriate, consider measures which might be taken either individually or jointly”. The phrase “if appropriate” serves as a qualifier, providing more flexibility in deciding the best course of action (Arifianto, 2025).
More importantly, the Australia-Indonesia Common Security Treaty is not a mutual defence pact. As Sambhi (2025) pointed out, the treaty differs from other Australian agreements with the same obligation to consult and consider joint measures: it stops short of requiring either party to provide automatic military assistance. A useful comparison can be drawn from the recently signed Pukpuk Treaty between Australia and Papua New Guinea, which specifically has a clause on mutual defense (Article 4). It declares that “an armed attack on either of the Parties within the Pacific would be dangerous to each other's peace and security and the security of the Pacific, and declares that it would act to meet the common danger”(DFAT, 2025). In any case, this kind of arrangement is highly improbable for Indonesia, whose foreign policy is guided by the principle of ‘Bebas Aktif’ (free-active), historically rooted in its non-alignment stance during the bipolar Cold War Order (Arasi, 2023). To maintain strategic autonomy, Indonesia remains independent and globally engaged, precluding a formal alliance. Since the treaty remains a non-alliance-forming one, it preserves Indonesia’s stance, a core attribute of hedging.
Another highlight of the new treaty is the elevation of consultation to the leaders’ level, not just to the level of ministers. This is an upgrade from the new treaty’s template, the short-lived 1995 Agreement on Maintaining Security (AMS), which was terminated four years later over the Australian-led UN peacekeeping force in East Timor. However, it should be noted that the two countries already engage regularly, such as through the 2+2 Foreign and Defense Ministers' Meeting and the Annual Leaders' Meeting.
The Persistence of Simultaneous Resistance and Cooperation
The insistence on not taking sides connects us to the second element of hedging, cultivating good relations with competing powers through mutually counteracting acts. Australia and Indonesia will pursue “mutually beneficial cooperative activities in the security field” under the Common Security Treaty. What this specifically entails and which security aspects are covered will only become clear upon full text publication. Despite the potential expansion of cooperation, this author is inclined to say that Jakarta’s dual acts will persist.
Hedging does not entail joining a full-fledged military alliance, for example, the trilateral security pact between Australia, the US, and the UK (AUKUS) or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between the US, Japan, Australia, and India (QUAD), that would certainly provoke China. It is about selective defiance and selective deference (Kuik, 2016). Consider last year’s events, Jakarta showed a clear example of hedging by stepping up its partnership with Canberra while concurrently making moves to revitalize security relations with Beijing. In August, Indonesia finalized and signed the 2024 Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with Australia, establishing a legal framework that would make it easier to have cooperative activities between the respective countries (Graham and Priyandita, 2025). In the same month, during the 2+2 Senior Officials’ Meeting of the Joint Foreign and Defence Ministerial Dialogue, Indonesia and China agreed to resume joint military exercises after a decade-long hiatus (Wei, 2024). In November 2024, the DCA produced a tangible outcome: Keris Woomera, a large-scale joint military drill in Bathurst Island, Australia, Situbondo-Banyuwangi, Indonesia, with around 2,000 troops participating (Khaliq, 2024). Then, in early December, though narrower in scope, Indonesia and China held a joint Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) exercise called “Heping Garuda” at army camps across Jakarta and Banten (Embassy of the PRC, 2024).
Since hedging is not “so much about targeting any single actor per se, but more about mitigating the broader risks stemming from uncertainty” (Kuik, 2016), Indonesia should not be overly dependent on one power. This could explain why Indonesia is gradually stepping up its defense cooperation with China, which had been lagging behind that with the US and allies like Australia (Laksmana, 2024). Since the issue of the North Natuna Sea was what led to the suspension of military exercises with China in the first place, it is important to highlight Indonesia’s changing sentiment under Prabowo (Farahdina, 2015). Specifically, a joint statement that contained a clause on joint development in areas of “overlapping claims” gave the impression that Jakarta was recognizing Beijing’s historical claims in the area. This also contrasted Indonesia’s non-claimant status in the dispute, which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was quick to reiterate in its clarification (Kartini et al., 2025). The inaugural ministerial-level dialogue this April, an upgrade from last year’s senior officials’ dialogue, also signalled readiness for more enhanced cooperation, with officials discussing potential joint military exercises, strengthening the main weapons system, and collaboration in the defense industry (Antara, 2025).
No Change in the Indo-Pacific
Beyond reaffirming shared concerns in the region, things remain ‘business as usual’. The effectiveness of regular consultations and optional cooperation will continue to rely on political will and tacit expectations (Syailendra, 2024).
(...) The first trilateral defense ministers meeting between Canberra and its two recent collaborators opens up the possibility of new platforms, though likely still within the regional norm of flexibility and non-exclusivity. This reflects Prabowo’s ambition for the Asia-Pacific. From his speech at the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting, despite invoking the sentiment of ‘no-division’ in the face of an increasingly fragmented world, it does not appear to chart a new course; instead, it reiterates broad calls for multilateralism and strengthened cooperation.
More broadly, Indonesia is exhibiting a more robust iteration of free and active foreign policy under the new administration (Anwar 2024). More than 30 foreign visits (Zahran, 2025), diversification of partnerships, in defense, even extending to the Global South middle powers, Turkey, India, and Brazil (Nathania and Kusumasomantri, 2025), membership in BRICs, and accession process to the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). All of that, just a year into the presidency, prompted observers to call Indonesia’s diplomacy restless and hyperactive.
With high speed and broad engagement with a range of partners, Jakarta can risk losing a coherent vision, reducing it to merely strategic transactionalism (Utama, 2025). However, it can be said that this is also Indonesia’s hedging response to the current strategic environment. Amid high uncertainty and high stakes, it is important to cultivate a fallback position by building relationships (Kuik, 2021), even if sometimes contradictory, and diversifying partnerships. Furthermore, in hedging, passivity is not recommended as it means foregoing some benefits (Kuik 2016). Indonesia has been showing a more active and opportunistic approach to maximize benefits from all sides, while remaining cautious by offsetting and mitigating risks.
Conclusion
The Indonesia-Australia Common Security Treaty, though a symbol of bolstered relationship between the two states, hardly changes Jakarta’s approach and, more broadly, the regional order. Further institutionalizing consultations, something the two have regularly done, does not lock either into a rigid alliance. Despite the new treaty with Australia, Indonesia is also likely to maintain relations with both sides, though in a cautious manner that does not directly provoke the US and its allies or China. It should not be a surprise that Jakarta has been establishing relationships with actors on opposing ends, since this is part of the broader strategy to diversify partnerships and establish a fallback position. Hedging remains the safest bet, as long as high stakes and high uncertainty persist, including in the Indo-Pacific.
This article represents the views of contributors to STEAR's online digital publication, and not those of STEAR, which takes no institutional positions.
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