Overview of Foreign Policy Adjectives of the Six New Non-Permanent Members of the UN Security Council

Introduction  

On June 3rd 2026, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly elected Austria, Portugal, Trinidad and Tobago, Kyrgyzstan, and Zimbabwe as five new non-permanent members of the the UN Security Council (UNSC), serving each a two-year term,  alongside the five permanent veto-holding members–France, the United Kingdom, China, Russia, and the United States– and strengthening their regions’ influence over global decisions on peace, security, sanctions, and crisis response. This article provides an overview of the current foreign policy positions of the new UNSC member states and outlines what might be expected from them on one key UN-related issue, the Russia-Ukraine war. These newly elected UNSC members matter because they shape global decisions on peace, security, sanctions, and crisis responses while giving their regions a stronger voice in international diplomacy.

General Assembly Holds Election of Non-permanent Members of Security Council in New York, 03/06/2026. Source: UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe (2026)

Austria

Austria presents itself as a moderate, historically neutral bridge-builder, reflecting its Cold War foreign policy role (Gehler and Bischof, 2006, pp. 2-3). While its accession to the EU in 1995 anchored it in Western economic integration, its continued military neutrality and non-membership in NATO strengthened its campaign for a UN Security Council seat (Civicus Lens, 2026). Austrian foreign policy focuses on regional stability, multilateralism, international law and security, including engagement in the Western Balkans, the EU neighbourhood, the Mediterranean and the Middle East (Federal Ministry, n.d.-a). Within the UN, Austria has also played an important role as a leading state in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and supporter of multiple peacekeeping operations with Austrian soldiers (Gehler and Bischhof, 2006, p.7). Additionally, Vienna has become a major hub of international diplomacy, hosting organisations such as the UN, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as landmark diplomatic conferences, including those leading to the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic Relations and on the Law of Treaties (Senn, Eder, Kornprobst, 2022, p. 2). 

Austria stands firmly with Ukraine in the Russia-Ukraine war. The Austrian federal ministry for foreign affairs states: “Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which began on February 24, 2022, represents a watershed moment and has fundamentally undermined trust at the bilateral level. The Russian Federation blatantly violated international law as well as the UN Charter and has shown disregard for the established international security order in an unprecedented manner.” (Federal Ministry, n.d.-b).

Portugal 

Portugal is firmly anchored in the Western camp as a member of both the EU and NATO, while its colonial history continues to give it influence in the Portuguese-speaking world. Before democratisation in 1975, Portuguese foreign policy centred on its overseas territories in Africa and Asia, but since joining the European Community in 1986, it has become increasingly Europeanised (Lourenço, 2018, para. 19). At the same time, Portugal’s Atlantic geography, including the Azores and Madeira, has kept transatlantic relations with the United States and Brazil important (Raimundo, Et al., 2021, pp. 4). Ever since joining the predecessor of the EU in 1986, Portugal has been on a journey of Europeanisation in its foreign policy, focusing on the continent rather than other Lusophone countries (Magone, 2006, pp. 25-26). Current Portuguese foreign policy is cornered on three pillars: (I) NATO, (II) Europe, (III) Portuguese-speaking Commonwealth (Dennison, 2019).

In terms of the Russia-Ukraine war, Portugal supports Ukraine “through humanitarian and financial support and the reception of beneficiaries of temporary protection, as well as with military support” (Diplomatic Portal, no date), and voted in favour of condemning Russia's invasion of Ukraine (UN, 2022).  

Trinidad and Tobago 

The small island state of Trinidad and Tobago was elected as the only candidate from Latin America and the Caribbean. Historically, Trinidad and Tobago was the wealthiest of the English-speaking Caribbean colonies and therefore attracted significant intra-Caribbean migration (Braveboy-Wagner, 2010, p. 414). Despite its size, the country has a comparatively strong economy, with a GDP of USD 25.943 billion, slightly higher than Mongolia’s GDP (World Bank, n.d.). Today, the country continues to play a leading economic role in the region, accounting for around 63% of total intra-CARICOM (Caribbean Community) export value (CARICOM, n.d.). Trinidad and Tobago’s foreign policy is shaped by regional leadership, multilateralism and pragmatic economic diplomacy. It seeks to amplify Caribbean interests in institutions such as the OAS and ECLAC, while promoting cooperation among CARICOM, Latin America and the wider Caribbean (Braveboy-Wagner, 2010, pp. 416-417). Its foreign policy rests on (I) sovereignty, (II) non-interference, (III) international law and adherence to the principles of the UN Charter  (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). 

Trinidad and Tobago voted in favour of condemning the Ukraine invasion by Russia (UN, 2022). During a meeting with the Russian ambassador to Trinidad and Tobago, the Trinidadian foreign minister, Dr. Amery Browne, underscored that Trinidad and Tobago views Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a violation of international law and supports a swift diplomatic resolution through multilateral action (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2024).

Kyrgyzstan

As a post-Soviet state in Central Asia, it has traditionally been viewed by Moscow as part of its sphere of influence (Gvineria, 2025). However, Russia’s economic influence has weakened since the invasion of Ukraine, with China becoming Kyrgyzstan’s leading export partner by 2024 (OEC, n.d.). Since independence in 1991, Kyrgyz foreign policy has remained dependency-oriented, described by Dzhuraev (2020, p. 2) as “dependency-as-supplicancy”, meaning that Bishkek often prioritises external assistance over consistent strategic goals or mutually attractive economic proposals. Kyrgyzstan’s dependency-oriented foreign policy allows it to maintain relations with several global and regional powers, but also requires Bishkek to balance the interests of Russia, China and the United States (Namatbekova and Saliev, 20217). Despite its multi-vector rhetoric, Kyrgyz foreign policy remains strongly shaped by dependence on Russia, limiting its room for manoeuvre compared with Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan (Vorobyov, 2026). Kyrgyzstan therefore presents itself as balanced and pragmatic, while remaining constrained by external dependencies (Kyrgyzstan Newsline, 2024).   

Kyrgyzstan defeated the Philippines by 142 votes to 49, winning a non-permanent seat for the first time since joining the UN in 1992 (Civicus Lens, 2026). However, its voting behaviour and security ties reflect its continued dependence on Moscow. Kyrgyzstan abstained during the UN vote condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (UN, 2022), and despite Western sanctions, it continues to maintain close relations with Russia, supported by a Russian military airbase, and mutual defence agreements between the two states (Vorobyov, 2026).

Zimbabwe 

Zimbabwe was elected to the UNSC as Africa’s uncontested candidate (Civicus Lens, 2026). Under President Emmerson Mnangagwa, Zimbabwe has shifted from isolationism toward economic opening and renewed diplomatic engagement, particularly with neighbouring states and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Ndimande and Moyo, 2018, p. 2). This re-engagement has shown some results, including African Development Bank support for sanctions relief and debt resolution, as well as a more conciliatory EU and UK approach toward Harare (Chikohomero, 2025, p. 11). China remains Zimbabwe’s strongest ally, as Western criticism over political violence, human rights abuses and land reforms pushed Harare into greater isolation. Beijing used this opening to expand its economic and strategic influence through trade, investment, aid and military cooperation, increasing Zimbabwe’s dependence on Chinese support (Melber and Southall, 2021, pp. 11). At the same time, Mnangagwa’s efforts to improve relations with the U.S. could create tensions within SADC if perceived as a shift away from regional solidarity (Ray, 2025).

Zimbabwe abstained from the UN vote on condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine (UN, 2022). Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa expressed support for Russia’s position on Ukraine, stating that: ‘Allow me to personally state that Zimbabwe is in solidarity with the Russian Federation in your country’s special military operation in Ukraine.’ (Africanews, 2024). Zimbabwe’s position reflects its long-standing ties with Russia, rooted in Soviet financial and military support for ZANU-PF during the liberation struggle, which continue to shape bilateral relations today.

Conclusion

Table 1 summarises the foreign policy adjectives of the six new non-permanent members of the UN Security Council.

Table 1. Summary of Foreign Policy Adjectives of the Six New Non-Permanent Members of the UN Security Council (Author, 2026)

Country	Foreign Policy approach
Austria	Neutral multilateral bridge-builder
Portugal	Euro-Atlantic multilateral connector
Trinidad and Tobago	Regional multilateral economic leader
Kyrgyzstan	Dependency-driven multi-vector balancing
Zimbabwe	Pragmatic re-engagement with authoritarian allies

Overall, the newly elected non-permanent members will enter the UNSC at a moment of deep geopolitical polarisation, with President Trump finishing his last two years as president of the United States and the war in Ukraine potentially reaching its end in this two-year time span. While Austria, Portugal, and Trinidad and Tobago are likely to strengthen the Council’s rules-based, multilateral and pro-Ukraine camp, Kyrgyzstan and Zimbabwe reflect a more cautious or Russia-aligned position shaped by dependency, historical ties and strategic balancing. The current dynamic therefore suggests that the new composition will not overcome existing divisions within the UNSC, but it will make the Council more representative of today’s fragmented international order, where small and medium-sized states navigate between legal principles, regional interests and great-power pressure. 

This article represents the views of contributors to STEAR's online digital publication, and not those of STEAR, which takes no institutional positions.

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