Beyond the Battlefield: How Russia’s Private Military Companies Reinvent Reflexive Control

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As global conflicts become increasingly intricate, Russia has pioneered a strategy that merges  military innovation with sophisticated psychological manipulation. Central to this approach is  Reflexive Control (RC), a theory aimed at influencing an adversary’s decision-making processes, now seamlessly integrated with the tactical deployment of private military companies (PMCs).  

Groups such as the Wagner Group have evolved beyond their initial role as mercenaries, becoming strategic tools that enable Russia to wage wars without officially engaging in them. Understanding how PMCs serve Russia’s Reflexive Control strategy is crucial for comprehending  not only contemporary conflicts but also the evolving nature of warfare itself. 

Although RC theory is sometimes described as “an advanced form of hybrid warfare” (Snegovaya, 2015, p. 7), its operational logic aligns more closely with non-linear warfare – a model characterised by the absence of clear frontlines and the erosion of distinctions between war and peace (Schnaufer II, 2017, pp. 21–22). While hybrid warfare emphasises the integration of conventional military force with cyber, disinformation, and other unconventional tactics (Schnaufer II, 2017, p. 17), non-linear warfare reflects a deeper strategic paradigm focused on indirect influence and cognitive disruption. 

In this framework, RC functions as a central mechanism of non-linear warfare, shaping perceptions and actions within PMCs and forming a core component of Russia’s strategic doctrine - Hosaka, 2019, p. 325. 

What is Reflexive Control Theory?

Initially developed by Soviet military theorists, Reflexive Control centres on one primary objective:  compelling an adversary to make decisions that align with one’s own strategic interests, all while  giving the illusion of voluntary action (Thomas, T. 2004, p.237). Unlike traditional military doctrine, which relies heavily on the direct application of force, RC focuses on manipulating the informational and psychological environment. It achieves this through the distortion of facts, dissemination of disinformation, creation of false narratives, and calculated deception. 

While Reflexive Control was first conceived during the Cold War to support military deception  operations, it has since matured into a comprehensive strategic approach (Vasara, 2020, p. 69; Vasara, 2020, p. 69). Today, RC no longer  merely supports kinetic military actions; it orchestrates them. It operates on a broader strategic  scale, targeting policymakers, military planners, media outlets, and civilian populations alike,  effectively weaponising perception and decision-making at every level of conflict engagement. 

Private Military Companies: Instruments of Plausible Deniability 

The rise of Russian PMCs, particularly Wagner, epitomises the modern application of Reflexive  Control. These entities offer Russia the benefit of plausible deniability, enabling it to intervene in  foreign conflicts without formal acknowledgment. This strategic ambiguity complicates  international responses and blurs the lines between state and non-state action, making attribution  of responsibility significantly more difficult. 

By operating in the so-called "gray zones" of conflict (Bukkvoll, 2021, p. 134), PMCs create layers of uncertainty that undermine the ability of adversaries to respond effectively. Their activities simultaneously obscure operational realities on the battlefield and sow confusion within the information environment, reinforcing Moscow’s strategic aims. This dual effect, operational and informational, makes PMCs potent force multipliers for Russia, allowing it to project power while avoiding the political  and diplomatic repercussions typically associated with overt military intervention. The ambiguity elicited by PMCs serves the logic of RC.

Case Studies: Ukraine and Syria

The conflicts in Ukraine and Syria offer clear examples of how Russia blends Reflexive Control (RC) theory with the deployment of private military companies (PMCs) to achieve its strategic objectives.

Russia’s integration of RC tactics through private military actors has evolved from plausible deniability in 2014 to overt psychological operations during and after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. During the annexation of Crimea, the use of the Wagner Group reflected core RC principles – particularly indirect participation and deliberate obfuscation. Wagner operatives, often referred to as “little green men,” operated in unmarked uniforms, concealing their affiliations and contributing to strategic ambiguity that disoriented both Ukrainian and Western responses (Fox, 2023, p. 608).

The 2022 invasion fundamentally altered the Wagner Group's operational status. While Russia consistently denied formal ties to this non-state armed group, Wagner's overt participation in the Ukrainian conflict rendered it openly affiliated with the Russian state. This was further evidenced by a large-scale recruitment initiative, reportedly approved by President Putin, which saw the enlistment of over 20,000 convicts for high-casualty engagements, most prominently in Bakhmut. Such developments signify Wagner's transition from a discreet proxy to a prominent instrument of state-led attrition warfare (Ber, 2023, pp. 4–5).

Simultaneously, Russia’s capacity to conceal its use of Wagner diminished due to the rise of open-source intelligence (OSINT), satellite imagery, and social media analysis (Fox, 2023, p. 608). These developments enabled the Ukrainian Armed Forces to adapt rapidly – developing countermeasures against fake surrenders, enhancing drone and surveillance operations, and promoting transparent communication strategies to counter Russian foreign policy narratives.

This transformation – from covert ambiguity to overt spectacle – demonstrates how Russia adapts its Reflexive Control strategy to changing battlefield and information environments. This deliberate uncertainty hampered Western efforts with Ukraine to coordinate an effective and unified response, allowing Russia to maintain a degree of plausible deniability while securing its strategic interests in the region.

In contrast to Ukraine, Russia’s use of private military companies (PMCs) in Syria presents a distinct case when viewed through the lens of Reflexive Control (RC) theory. Following the Arab Uprisings, Russia deployed the Wagner Group to support the Assad regime, providing air and sea logistical assistance as well as training for Syrian government forces. Additionally, Russia established a dedicated Wagner base in Rostov-on-Don, serving as a logistical hub for PMC operations in Syria. (Akram, A. A., & Qudsia, 2024, p.36).  Despite this level of coordination, the Russian government consistently denied any formal connection with Wagner, reinforcing its strategy of plausible deniability.

While securing geopolitical and economic interests in the Middle East, Russia also pursued a broader strategic goal – “to stop the West from ignoring them” (Bukkvoll, 2021, p. 135). In this context, RC theory played a central role by enabling Moscow to manipulate Western perceptions, particularly those of the United States and NATO, through calculated ambiguity and deception.

The ad hoc use of Wagner exemplifies how PMCs became strategic instruments for executing Reflexive Control. By outsourcing risk to deniable actors, Moscow was able to avoid international condemnation and project power while minimizing political costs. In doing so, PMCs not only protect the Kremlin from reputational damage on the global stage but also position Russia as a covert adversary to the U.S. and NATO (Akram, A. A., & Qudsia, 2024, p.36).

Why Does It Matters? 

Russia’s integration of Reflexive Control and private military companies signals a profound  transformation in the conduct of modern warfare. Conflicts are increasingly less about traditional  battlefield victories and more about shaping adversaries' decisions and public perceptions. The  fusion of information warfare and kinetic operations forms a seamless strategy where ambiguity,  misinformation, and narrative manipulation often determine success or failure long before  conventional forces are deployed. 

Moreover, the use of PMCs disrupts established norms of international humanitarian law (IHL) and accountability. By blurring the distinction between state and non-state actors, Russia undermines traditional deterrence mechanisms and erodes the frameworks that have historically governed interstate conflict. Without clear attribution of actions, it becomes difficult for international actors to hold  Russia accountable or craft effective countermeasures. Consequently, Western states risk being persistently outmanoeuvred, not through overwhelming military force, but through the strategic manipulation of reality itself.

Challenges Ahead: Responding to Reflexive Control 

Confronting Reflexive Control presents unique challenges. One of its most insidious aspects is that studying or responding to RC risks falling into the trap of reacting on Russia’s terms. By manipulating the flow of information, including through open-source intelligence (OSINT), media outlets, and even academic discourse, Russia can distort the analytical frameworks through which Western states interpret and respond to its strategies. This is particularly evident in the use of OSINT during the Ukraine conflict. 

As noted by Illia Varzhanskyi (2023), the reliability of OSINT data on Russian military activity since 2014 is compromised by Russia’s use of Reflexive Control (RC) mechanisms, which deliberately aim to mislead observers and researchers (pp. 419–423). As a result, security analysts and institutions may unknowingly base their conclusions on manipulated or incomplete data, becoming indirect “victims” of the very strategy they seek to study.

Thus, fighting Reflexive Control requires more than simply countering propaganda or debunking  misinformation. It demands deep societal resilience, agile policy frameworks, and a fundamental  shift in mindset. Policymakers must move from a reactive posture, focused on individual incidents, towards an anticipatory approach that seeks to understand and disrupt the broader strategic narratives being constructed by adversaries. Critical thinking, information literacy, and  institutional adaptability are essential tools for maintaining strategic autonomy in an era where the battlefield is as much cognitive as it is physical.

Conclusion 

Russia’s use of private military companies within its Reflexive Control strategy marks not just a  tactical evolution, but a paradigm shift in the nature of conflict itself.

The frontlines of  contemporary and future wars are increasingly drawn not on geographic maps but in the minds of policymakers, citizens, and international institutions. 

By manipulating perceptions, blurring legal and operational categories, and outsourcing violence,  Moscow is reshaping the very definition of warfare. This transforms conflicts into nonlinear engagements, where victory is achieved through controlling information, shaping narratives, and strategically managing uncertainty long before any overt military action begins.

For governments, security agencies, and defense policy makers, particularly in NATO or Western states, recognising and adapting to this reality is no longer optional. Failure to  understand and counter Reflexive Control, especially as deployed through private military companies, risks forfeiting strategic advantage before battles are even fought. In this evolving landscape, maintaining resilience, cultivating cognitive vigilance, and fostering strategic foresight are essential not merely for victory, but for survival itself. 

Understanding Russia’s sophisticated integration of Reflexive Control and PMCs is not just an  academic endeavor, it is a critical requirement for NATO/Western States committed to safeguarding international stability and democratic resilience in the 21st century.

This article represents the views of external contributors to STEAR's online digital publication, and not those of STEAR, which takes no institutional positions.

Miranda Mchedlishvili comes from Georgia, currently living in Brussels, Belgium, and currently pursues a Master’s degree in International Relations at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, specializing in security studies. Miranda is particularly interested in how states’ strategic mindsets and behavioral patterns shape their security orientations and influence both global and regional dynamics.

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