Rift in the Turkic World: Does Cyprus show the limits of the Organization of Turkic States?

The evolving foreign policies of Central Asian states emerge as a critical crossroads in the Organization of Turkic States’ (OTS) vision of pan-Turkic solidarity, a fact best exemplified by last April’s European Union (UN)–Central Asia summit. While most media outlets focused on the €12 billion investment package the EU unveiled and the absence of clear trade deals regarding critical raw materials, one interesting fact remained largely unmentioned: the Central Asian states’ support of United Nations (UN) resolutions 541 and 550 in the summit’s joint text, which underline the territorial integrity of Cyprus. 

The Central Asian countries’ support of these resolutions has led to tensions with their ally Türkiye, the only UN member to recognise the breakaway state of Northern Cyprus. Three of the joint text’s signatories – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan – are members of the OTS, a multilateral organization led by Ankara that aims to foster political, economic, and cultural cooperation among Turkic-majority states. Another signatory, Turkmenistan, acts as an observer state.

This article seeks to discuss the Central Asian states’ motivation for supporting the resolutions and whether this decision showcases the limitations of pan-Turkic cooperation.

Note. Türkiye at the 7th Summit of Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States in Baku, Azerbaijan. From the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Background

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Türkiye was the first country to recognise the independence of the five Central Asian former Soviet republics (Matveev, 2025). At the time, both sides were looking to diversify their trade relations and liberalise their economies: the Central Asian countries, having broken loose from Soviet rule, sought to flesh out their own foreign and trade policies, while Türkiye was carrying out market liberalisation reforms under President Turgut Özal (Alpay, 2025). This resulted in the signing of over 140 agreements in political, cultural, economic, and military affairs between Türkiye and the Central Asian states. Additionally, from 1992 to 1996, nearly 90% of all foreign development aid flowing into Central Asia came from Türkiye (Alaranta & Silvan, 2022).

The year 1992 also saw the establishment of the Community of Turkic Speaking States (CTSS), a first Turkish-led attempt at regional integration that included Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in its ranks (Cetinkaya & Demirel, 2024). However, the CTSS remained largely ineffective as many Central Asian states grew suspicious of Türkiye’s ambitions in the region, perceiving its approach as patronising (Ülgen & Umarov, 2024). Bilateral relations were also strained by the pan-Turkic and Sufi-Islamist teachings at religious schools in Central Asia that were funded by Türkiye, highlighting differences in the two sides’ handling of political Islam (Alaranta & Silvan, 2022).

The prospect of pan-Turkic cooperation regained traction in 2009 when two of the Turkic Central Asian states – Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan – came together with Türkiye and Azerbaijan to revamp the CTSS as the “Turkic Council,” now known as the Organization of Turkic States (Kussainova, 2024). Uzbekistan also joined the organization in 2019. Initially the brainchild of long-time Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, the OTS set out to foster and enhance political, economic and cultural cooperation between member states, which all trace their ethnic roots back to the Turkic peoples originating in Central-East Asia (Pillalamari, 2016). 

While the OTS has achieved considerable success in implementing joint cultural projects, such as the “Common Alphabet Commission,” it has faced difficulties reaching its goal of tightening and increasing trade ties between member states, with intra-bloc trade even shrinking between 2009 and 2019 (Trilling, 2019). This was in large part due to Türkiye’s own economic woes, putting economic cooperation within the OTS on the country’s back burner. The organization has since attempted to right the ship by introducing the Turkic Investment Fund (TIF), which is slated to develop and finance joint economic and infrastructure projects between member states with an authorised capital of $1 billion (Kwan, 2024).

The Cyprus issue

Even before signing the joint declaration at the end of the Samarkand summit, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan had recently made strides to signal their openness to closer relations with the Republic of Cyprus. Between December 2024 and March 2025, all three appointed their own diplomatic representative to the country, while Kazakhstan went a step further by opening an embassy in Nicosia (Cancarini, 2025).  

Cyprus’ claim to territorial integrity has been a mainstay in high-level talks between the EU and Central Asian countries over the past years. In 2023, an official from the EU diplomatic service European External Action Service (EEAS) warned of “negative effects” if the region’s OTS members were to ratify Northern Cyprus as an observer to the organisation (Gotev, 2023). While Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had previously unilaterally granted Northern Cyprus observer status during the November 2022 summit (Hasanova, 2022), other members pushed back against the decision, in particular then-Uzbek foreign minister Vladimir Norov (Fergana Agency, 2022). However, Northern Cyprus was included in the recent Budapest Declaration following the informal summit in May 2025, showcasing the strategic ambiguity of Central Asian leaders towards the issue.

Although Türkiye has so far remained mute on an official level, Central Asia’s turn towards Europe is widely seen as a significant blow to President Erdoğan’s vision of his country as the centre of the Turkic world. During the recent informal summit in Budapest, he alluded to this by calling for “increased solidarity” between members and demanding more support for Northern Cyprus (Daily Sabah, 2025), a plea he has reiterated several times over the past few years. 

Türkiye’s relentless support of Northern Cyprus in the face of heavy pressure from the international community has its own distinct motivations. Besides the “protection” of the island’s Turkish/Turkish Cypriot population from alleged Greek oppression – a notion that is increasingly being challenged by Turkish Northern Cypriots themselves (Smith, 2025) – Northern Cyprus plays a vital role in Türkiye’s energy ambitions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye (2022) has disclosed that the notably energy-poor country has imported roughly 65% of its energy needs, which makes the exploration of possible domestic sources of energy an important point in its aspirations to become more energy-independent. In this background, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean holds a vast reserve of natural gas which could significantly alleviate Türkiye's energy dilemma. In this case, Türkiye's recognition of Northern Cyprus and the news surrounding the contentions over the potential gas explorations will play a decisive role in its energy policy, which may put it at odds with the rest of the international community that recognises Northern Cyprus' EEZ as part of Cyprus.

Türkiye's recognition of Northern Cyprus and the news surrounding the contentions over the potential gas explorations will play a decisive role in its energy policy, which may put it at odds with the rest of the international community that recognises Northern Cyprus' EEZ as part of Cyprus.

Central Asia’s pursuit of sovereignty

There are two main reasons why Central Asia is reluctant to enhance cooperation with Northern Cyprus. First is the core tenet of territorial sovereignty in their foreign policy. Whether it be border skirmishes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan or Karakalpak separatism in Uzbekistan, the concept of territorial sovereignty is often alluded to in regional leaders’ policy considerations. The territorial hodgepodge created by the Soviets to divide the region survived into the modern era, with zigzagging borders and, at times, unclear demarcations. Moreover, Central Asia has been more adamant in maintaining their current borders and rejecting the recognition of numerous separatist entities as showcased by its current aggression against Ukraine and the previous 2008 Georgian-Russian war. Notably, 18% of the Kazakhstan population is composed of Russian minority and currently shares a direct land border with Russia and therefore, Central Asian leaders remain wary of strengthening official ties with Northern Cyprus with the negative effects these may pose in their respective domestic spaces. 

Secondly, the EU wields more economic power than Türkiye, offering greater opportunities for trade and investment between the two actors. In 2023, the EU’s trade turnover with Central Asia clocked in at €59 billion (European Council, 2025), while that of Türkiye totalled roughly €13 billion (Ülgen & Umarov, 2024). This disparity is also reflected in the amount of foreign direct investments (FDI) both actors pour into Central Asia: the EU – according to its own figures – was responsible for 42% of FDI flows into Central Asia in 2022 (Alam & Teddy, 2025), far exceeding Türkiye’s approximate 15% and making it the region’s largest foreign donor. With its growing demand for rare earth minerals and alternative energy sources, Europe is projected to remain a reliable buyer for decades to come, which may be especially lucrative for Central Asia’s biggest economy, Kazakhstan, as the country possesses large supplies of critical raw materials, including uranium, zinc, copper, manganese, among others (Nakispekova, 2024). Given this, Central Asian leaders are bound to steer clear of any political moves that may jeopardise their trade relations with the EU. 

The OTS’ future

While the fallout from the Cyprus situation will not lead to the downfall of the OTS, it has certainly put into question the alliance’s medium- to long-term outlook. Despite President Erdoğan’s persistent efforts to integrate Northern Cyprus into the organisation in the near future, Central Asian member states are unlikely to pivot from their current stance. This episode has also exposed a greater divergence between Türkiye’s and Central Asia’s approach to the OTS and their foreign policy as a whole. Whereas Türkiye aims to project its power in the Turkic sphere as part of its Neo-Ottoman foreign policy, the Central Asian countries see the OTS as merely one of several vectors in their attempt to diversify their foreign relations away from Chinese and Russian dominance. Türkiye, albeit remaining an important pillar within this multi-vector approach, does not outweigh Europe, which is scaling up its engagement with Central Asia. 

Whereas Türkiye aims to project its power in the Turkic sphere as part of its Neo-Ottoman foreign policy, the Central Asian countries see the OTS as merely one of several vectors in their attempt to diversify their foreign relations away from Chinese and Russian dominance.

Regardless of this setback, Türkiye and Central Asia will continue cooperating on core issues, particularly concerning cultural initiatives, economic cooperation and the expansion of infrastructure ties. The latter point is especially of vital importance to OTS member states, as they project to play a major role in the so-called Middle Corridor: a trade route connecting China and Europe while bypassing Russia. The development of the corridor may be a major reason why Türkiye has not reacted more fervently to the rapprochement between Europe and Central Asia, as the country’s involvement could still theoretically be circumvented through Georgia’s Black Sea ports (Ozersin, 2025). When asked about Central Asia’s diplomatic advances in Cyprus, Turkish foreign minister Hakan Fidan stated in late April that, while understandable, “there are also areas where we see that the EU is trying to exploit this mutual interest. Certain individuals trying to create a rift between us based on this latest development are asking us to discuss this issue openly in public. We prefer not to discuss family matters in public as a principle” (Ozersin, 2025). Fidan’s remarks reflect Türkiye’s broader approach toward Central Asia, rooted in common kinship and culture, and its ambitions to make the OTS a leading platform for Central Asian states in their foreign policy.

Conclusion

The discussions surrounding the territorial integrity of Cyprus at the EU-Central Asia summit, along with some of the Central Asian states' endorsement of UN resolutions discussing this affirmation, will certainly emphasise the dynamics of the region's foreign policy and Pan-Turkic's cooperation under Türkiye’s leadership. Central Asia's decision to pursue strategic autonomy over ideological solidarity with this leadership may showcase its commitment to its pragmatic approach to economic partnerships and its strong commitment to territorial sovereignty especially in the face of a larger and more powerful actor such as the EU with the greater trade and investment opportunities available for these emerging Central Asian markets. Diverging national interests may become a focal point in the overall political cohesion of the Organization of Turkic States which will certainly impact the balance of influence in the Turkic world from Türkiye to a more economically-driven and multipolar regional diplomacy.

This article represents the views of contributors to STEAR's online digital publication, and not those of STEAR, which takes no institutional positions.

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