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North Korea’s 9th Congress: Continuity at Home, Uncertainty Abroad

Updated: Jun 19

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un delivers a speech during the 9th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) in Pyongyang, North Korea (19/2/2026). Source: KCNA, 2026
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un delivers a speech during the 9th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) in Pyongyang, North Korea (19/2/2026). Source: KCNA, 2026

Introduction

As the Workers’ Party of Korea’s (WPK) highest decision-making body, the Congress has offered valuable insights into North Korea’s domestic and foreign policy directions. This article focuses on the 9th Congress of the WPK, held in Pyongyang from February 19-25, addressing two key questions: What does the 9th Congress reveal about North Korea’s domestic priorities and internal power reconfiguration? How does North Korea position itself geopolitically in relation to the United States (US), South Korea, Russia, and China? 

This article utilised the North Korean official newspaper Rodong Sinmun (로동신, Labour Newspaper) as a primary source. While acknowledging that the source is ideologically driven, this article treats it as valuable because it is the publishing organ of the WPK Central Committee, which provides insight into how the regime seeks to present itself and the direction of its policy trajectory. 


Regime Priorities and Internal Power Reconfiguration

At the 9th Congress, Kim Jong Un claimed that North Korea had achieved the goals set at the 8th Congress, despite what he described as a ‘barbaric blockade’ from hostile forces, sanctions pressure, natural disasters, and a global health crisis (Rodong Sinmun, 2026b).  However, this claim should be treated with caution, as the regime provided few concrete statistics beyond housing construction (Cha et al., 2026). Even so, the Congress suggested a notable rhetorical shift: Rather than focusing on production targets, the regime placed more emphasis on livelihood, welfare, and regional development, particularly through the “20×10 Regional Development Policy” (Lee, 2026; Rodong Sinmun, 2026d). Therefore, whilst it seems North Korea’s economy may have recovered somewhat, it remains unclear to what extent the goals set at the 8th Congress were actually met.


The Congress was more revealing regarding internal power reconfiguration. While Kim was re-elected as WPK general secretary on February 22, changes in the party’s elite composition offer clues on both Kim’s third term and possible succession politics surrounding his daughter, Kim Ju Ae. Although earlier reports had noted the removal of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il’s portraits (the first two leaders in North Korea’s dynastic line) from the presidium in 2021 and the later display of Kim Jong Un’s portrait alongside theirs, the new development at the 9th Congress was the appearance of Kim Jong Un's portrait badges among senior cadres, indicating a further personalisation of political authority (Jeong, 2026; NK NEWS, 2020; The Asahi Shimbun, 2024). 


Personnel shakeups within the Party Central Committee also drew attention, notably the exit of senior figures associated with the so-called second generation of partisans (빨치산 2세, Ppalchisan i-se). Among those stepping aside were Choe Ryong Hae, a prominent North Korean official described as Kim’s close confidant. While some view these shifts as major, others interpret them as a routine generational transition given cohort ageing and similar reshuffles at the previous Congress (Cha et al., 2026; Jeong, 2026). Nonetheless, the thinning presence of elites associated with Kim's predecessors suggests that Kim has more room to place loyalists within the party structure. 


Regarding Kim Ju Ae, no official designation of heir was made. The Sejong Institute’s report (2026) outlined two possibilities: either Kim Ju Ae has not been formally assigned within the party system, or a designation may have been made internally without public announcement. Korea Institute for National Unification senior fellow Cho Han Bum suggested that if it happens, a formal designation might occur around 2031 (KBS NEWS, 2026). Possible indicators include the expansion of the Secretariat of the WPK Central Committee from eight to twelve members, and the strengthened role of Kim Yo Jong (Kim Jong Un’s sister), who was promoted to department head and re-entered the Politburo as an alternate member.


The former is notable because the Secretariat previously expanded during the Kim Jung Il and Kim Jong Un's periods which saw the institutionalisation of the body. In the latter case, Jeong (2026) drew parallel with Kim Kyong Hui’s (Kim’s aunt) role during the consolidation of Kim Jong Il’s succession to Kim Jong Un, suggesting the possibility that Kim Yo Jong could play a similar supporting role if a succession process were ever to be built around Kim Ju Ae.


North Korea’s Foreign Relations and Security Posture

With Rodong Sinmun’s February 26th report providing a comprehensive summary of the regime’s stance on foreign relations, the Congress also showed that Pyongyang’s diplomatic stance is closely tied to the continued reinforcement of the military line established at the 8th Congress, rather than to any fundamentally new strategic roadmap (NK PRO, 2026; Shin, 2026).


First, North Korea still considers the US as the main source of geopolitical tension, citing Washington’s ‘hereditary and chronic’ hostile policy, the ‘invasive’ expansion of the US-led military blocs in the Asia-Pacific, and the persistence of ‘American hegemony’ as reasons for this perception. Although Kim Jong Un reaffirmed that the regime would take the ‘toughest possible’ stance toward the US, it still appears to be conditionally open to improved relations, as reflected in statements suggesting ties could improve if the U.S. respects North Korea’s status and abandons its hostile policy.


In this sense, expressions such as ‘proportional response’ indicate that the regime views any improvements in bilateral relations as dependent solely on Washington's behaviour (Rodong Sinmun, 2026d). This role was reaffirmed, along with the military stance established at the 8th Congress, with particular emphasis on the ‘practical operation’ of nuclear forces under the National Defence Development Five-Year Plan. 


In contrast, North Korea’s stance on South Korea appears markedly more hostile, with little sign of reconciliation. Since declaring at the 8th Party Central Committee that the ‘one nation, two systems’ formula was no longer possible, Kim Jong Un has continued to frame South Korea as ‘not a trustworthy neighbour capable of coexistence’ (Rodong Sinmun, 2023, 2026d). Furthermore, North Korea explicitly criticised the current South Korean government’s conciliatory approach, further framing South Korea as ‘the most hostile entity’ and one that is ‘permanently excluded from the category of compatriots’ (Rodong Sinmun, 2026d). Although this language echoes prolonged rhetoric, what attracted interest was its focus on border fortification and the deployment of military forces along the southern border. The Congress claimed its military capabilities were developed 'theoretically and technologically’ and mentioned the potential 'complete collapse of South Korea.’ This linked the hostile stance to expanding the regime’s military, including more rocket launchers, artillery, missiles, and upgrades to training, naval nuclear capabilities, and AI weapons in a span of five years (Rodong Sinmun, 2026a, 2026d).


On the other hand, China and Russia received surprisingly little direct attention. While Rodong Sinmun continuously reported congratulatory messages from both authorities, with Russia describing bilateral ties as ‘brotherly’ and China expressing willingness to strengthen ‘friendly and cooperative ties,' the recent tightening of North Korea–Russia relations and the apparent recovery of North Korea–China relations were not prominently highlighted in Kim’s summary report (Rodong Sinmun, 2026a, 2026b, 2026c). According to the Asan Institute,

"... this relative silence might indicate either the regime’s dissatisfaction with support from both countries, an effort to avoid seeming overly dependent on Moscow and Beijing, or anxiety over what Pyongyang perceives as an insufficiently strong Chinese and Russian response to U.S. foreign policy. Still, any firm conclusion remains premature (Cha et al., 2026).  

Conclusion

Rather than a dramatic policy transformation, regime consolidation was the Congress's core message. Although the regime’s confident messaging on domestic development, military strengthening, and foreign affairs reaffirmed existing strategic lines, this continuity should not be considered politically insignificant. On the contrary, a key takeaway in the current geopolitical climate is understanding the regime’s external stance, especially related to recent tensions involving authoritarian leaders in Venezuela and Iran.


Considering their links to the Trump administration’s foreign policy initiatives, North Korea’s approach to its diplomatic positioning may point to a potential future source of international tension. This does not necessarily mean that North Korea is preparing for immediate confrontation, but it does suggest that its external strategy is being recalibrated in ways that remain difficult to predict. 


For example, while some projections suggest Kim might reopen dialogue with Trump around his planned China visit, North Korea’s growing confidence in its war-deterring capabilities might outweigh fears of regime collapse from outside powers. This stance has gained deeper foundationed when the missile launches when North Korea fired more than 10 ballistic missiles into the East Sea during a joint South Korea-US military drill in March 2026 despite Trump’s renewed call for dialogue (NK NEWS, 2026a). At a minimum, these developments suggest that the regime is unlikely to perceive itself as vulnerable or as making concessions.


This point becomes even more significant when read together with the regime’s recent emphasis on arming the entire population (전민무장화, Jeonmin mujang-hwa) and fortifying the whole country (전국요새화, Jeonguk yosae-hwa), which are military strategies associated with the intensification of inter-Korean tensions in the 1960s (Tongil News, 2026). Moreover, North Korea’s newly signed cooperation treaty with Belarus implies a widening pattern of solidarity among states aligned against the US-led order, suggesting the possibility of a trilateral alignment with Russia (NK NEWS, 2026b). Therefore, caution and further observations are warranted. However, the stronger interpretation is that North Korea is seeking to preserve continuity while preparing for future adjustments at home and abroad. 



This article represents the views of contributors to STEAR's online digital publication, and not those of STEAR, which takes no institutional positions.


REFERENCES

Rodong Sinmun. (2023, December 31). 조선로동당 중앙위원회 제8기 제9차 전원회의 확대회의에 관한 보도. Report on the Enlarged Meeting of the 9th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea.

Rodong Sinmun. (2026a, February 20). 조선로동당 제9차대회 성대히 개막. The 9th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea Grandly Opens.

Rodong Sinmun. (2026b, February 21). 조선로동당 제9차대회 2일회의 진행. [The 9th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea Proceeds with Second-Day Session]

Rodong Sinmun. (2026c, February 25). 조선로동당 제9차대회 부문별 연구 및 협의회 진행. [Sectoral Studies and Consultative Meetings of the 9th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea Held]

Rodong Sinmun. (2026d, February 26). 조선로동당 제9차대회에 관한 보도. [Report on the 9th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea]

Shin, B. (2026, February 27). 북한 9차 당대회 군사 분야 평가 및 시사점 [An Assessment of the Military Sector at North Korea’s 9th Party Congress and Its Implications] [Issue Brief]. https://www.sejong.org/web/boad/1/egoread.php?bd=1&itm=&txt=&pg=2&seq=12764 

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