From Global to Guarded Britain: Rethinking Aid in Times of Insecurity

Introduction

Figure 1. UK ODA Spending (in £ million) and ODA:GNI ratios (%), 1970 - 2024

(Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, 2025, p. 9)

The foreign policy of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) is being reshaped under geopolitical pressure, with a new objective of raising military expenditure to 2.6% of the UK’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), at the expense of Official Development Assistance (ODA) (Loft & Brien, 2025). Gross National Income (GNI) ratios have declined and become volatile since 2021, highlighting a departure from the country’s long-standing 0.7% ODA commitment and representing a shift towards more defence-oriented investments (see Figure 1). 

On top of the overall decrease in UK ODA, the provided aid has markedly increased to specific nations. As shown in Figure 2, bilateral ODA has reoriented towards Ukraine and Gaza (OECD, 2021, p. 6; FCDO, 2025, p. 9), following the changing geopolitical and humanitarian realities. This marks a pivot away from small-scale, sustained aid allocation, which has previously been used as a preventive tool against conflict.

In February 2025, the UK government announced plans to further reduce ODA spending from 0.5% to 0.3% of its GNI in 2027 (OECD, 2025, p. 2), reflecting its transition from the post-Brexit “global Britain” to a more defensive “guarded Britain.” Prime Minister Keir Starmer has presented this shift as an essential step to safeguard Europe’s defence, especially given the increasingly uncertain nature of American security guarantees (Gulrajani & Pudussery, 2025). Yet this action reflects a more general North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-wide trend, with average defence spending rising by approximately 65% between 2018 and 2024 (Gulrajani & Pudussery, 2025). 

The consequences of this shift are particularly visible in the Western Balkans (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia), a region Starmer named “Europe’s crucible,” a laboratory of ethnic histories and great power rivalry: “the place where the security of our continent is put to the test” (Sparrow, 2025). This framing, nonetheless, did not prevent the UK from announcing on 20 December 2025 a 40% ODA funding cut to the Western Balkans, reducing allocations from £40 to £24 million (Boffey, 2025). Hence, a question arises: “How does the UK’s decrease in ODA in the Western Balkans affect its national security objectives in the region?” 

This article argues that reallocating aid does not strengthen security. Instead, it creates space for adversarial influence and diminishes the UK’s soft power, ignoring the cost-effectiveness of peacebuilding and ultimately increasing, rather than reducing, security risks.               

Security Vacuum

The UK’s ODA cuts produce a security vacuum that weakens regional resilience against disinformation and cyberattacks. This vulnerability stems from reductions to the Integrated Security Fund (ISF) in the Western Balkans from £31.91 million in 2024-2025 to £17 million in 2025-2026, following the fiscal trade-off to increase defence spending to 2.6% (Boffey, 2025). These resources were pivotal for sustaining independent media operations and countering Russian cyberattacks (Cipan & Kirichenko, 2025, p. 69), as well as its disinformation campaigns portraying NATO and the European Union (EU) as weak, fragmented, and aggressive, thereby undermining further Western Balkan integration into Euro-Atlantic structures (Cipan & Kirichenko, 2025, p. 71). 

At the same time, the withdrawal of Western funding incentivises local elites to seek alternative sources of support. Western financial assistance is often viewed as lengthy, complicated, and misaligned with domestic political incentives, particularly because local elites are insufficiently and inconsistently involved in ODA design and implementation (Rrustemi et al., 2019, p. 95). In this context, China has emerged as a more reliable development partner, providing large-scale infrastructure loans (Soyaltin-Colella, 2022). Yet, as the UK’s National Security Strategy warns, such economic coercion and supply chain dependencies grant China a strategic advantage and leverage in the region (UK Government, 2025, p. 11). In Montenegro, for example, a Chinese loan to construct the Bar-Boljare highway raised state debt to 80% of its GDP (Rrustemi et al., 2019, p. 95). Recipient states have demonstrated their readiness to dilute or block international condemnations of China’s human rights record in exchange for continued investments (Rrustemi et al., 2019, p. 101). Consequently, the UK’s retreat from the Western Balkans risks distorting a strategic balance, thereby allowing China’s influence to entrench.

Peacebuilding and Development

Peacebuilding as a cost-efficient tool appears similarly discarded. Empirical evidence demonstrates that preventative investment in peacebuilding is more cost-effective than reactive military spending (Conciliation Resources, 2025, p. 2). According to the Institute for Economics and Peace, the respective allocations decrease the cost of conflict, including humanitarian aid, reconstruction, and military intervention, by approximately 16% (Conciliation Resources, 2025, p. 2). Nevertheless, peacebuilding merely accounts for 2% of the UK’s ODA budget. A UK-supported program, successfully concluded in the Somali Region of Ethiopia following a 25-year civil war, cost half the price of a Challenger tank (Conciliation Resources, 2025, p. 2), demonstrating the greater returns from minor investments in peacebuilding than from military expenditure. 

Notably, the country’s National Security Strategy explicitly states that “strength abroad” is achieved at the intersection of defence, diplomacy, development, technology, and cultural outreach (UK Government, 2025, p. 29). Yet, the ODA cuts in the Western Balkans contradict this strategy, as institutional expertise, such as region-specific knowledge and local-language capacity, about the region is lost, while peacebuilding tools are scaled back (Lazell & Petrikova, 2025, p. 321). Taken together, this inconsistency in pursuing foreign policy goals and in their practical implementation undermines the effectiveness of the UK’s security strategy in the region.

Fiscal Necessity

The UK Government argues that the enhanced defence expenditure is indispensable in an era of  “radical uncertainty”(UK Government, 2025, p. 4), defined by Russian aggression and growing strategic competition. At the same time, rapid technological transformation is changing the nature of war and domestic security (UK Government, 2025, p. 4). Therefore, increased defence spending is portrayed as an unavoidable response. This urgency is reinforced by the withdrawal of American security guarantees, driven by the new Administration’s increasingly volatile behaviour towards Europe, which urges an increase in defence spending to reduce U.S. dependence (UK Government, 2025, p. 45). Furthermore, ODA cuts reflect a broader trend among Western donors. Most notably, in 2025, the United States dismantled the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and cancelled over 80% of its foreign aid contracts (Puri et al., 2025, p. 2). Other European donors, including France, Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands, have implemented similar reductions (Puri et al., 2025, p. 4).

Yet treating defence and aid as a zero-sum trade-off limits a holistic understanding of current security dynamics (Gulrajani & Pudussery, 2025). The UK’s own strategy asserts that national security is “inextricably linked” to global stability, which, besides defence, includes soft power, technological development, and peacebuilding (UK Government, 2025, p. 10). Therefore, diluting the country’s influence in the region runs counter to its strategy and will likely generate instability (Puri & O’Sullivan, 2025, p. 2). 

Past ISF initiatives demonstrated the effectiveness of aid-funded security measures to provide regional stability and development. In Kosovo, Montenegro, and North Macedonia, the Fund helped catalyse investments to strengthen institutional capacity and legislation, thereby enhancing their ability to counter cyberattacks. Furthermore, in Albania, a UK-supported app enabled women to report cases of intimidation during elections (Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office & Cabinet Office, 2025, p. 5). By strengthening electoral legitimacy and public trust in the government, such initiatives contribute to reducing malign Russian disinformation and intimidation strategies. Consequently, ODA programs function as preventative security measures, reducing the risk of destabilising interference in Europe, and thereby contributing indirectly to the UK’s national security. This highlights that aid-funded soft power tools can be an effective part of defence policy, demonstrating that a 40% ODA reduction would not constitute a calculated reallocation of resources but rather a retreat that risks undermining the security strategy the UK seeks to pursue.

Conclusion

The UK’s ODA cuts to the Western Balkans contradict its own stated security objectives, undermining regional resilience against disinformation and cyberattacks and exposing the region to Chinese or Russian influence. At the same time, aid reductions limit the usage of proven cost-effective security tools, such as peacebuilding and development cooperation.

Defence and development are not competing priorities. Reactive military expenditure is incomparable to the cost of preventive targeted diplomacy and aid programs. Rather than strengthening national security, the UK’s cuts to ODA in the Western Balkans advance future instability and impose long-term financial burdens. This demonstrates that diplomacy and development are not antithetical to defence, but its crucial preventative components.

This article represents the views of contributors to STEAR's online digital publication, and not those of STEAR, which takes no institutional positions.

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